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Ivo Wallirnann-Helm er 
Comment on An drew List er. 
Just Distribution(s) for Mutual Recognition 
Ab8trar:t: This commr�nt questions Lister's reading of the reciprocity condition in three 
respects. First, it challenges the view that this condition necessarily leads to ega.litaria.n 
claims about just distribution. Secondly, it questions Lister's argument that the reci­
procity condition is linked to substantial schemes of egalitarian distribution irrespective 
of context. Thirdly, it claims that entitlements to justice for people with mental or 
psychological impairments cannot be based on a distinct.ion betwer�n willingness and 
unwillingness to contribute to the cooperative venture of a society. 
1. Introduction 
The reciprocity condition is often subject. to two criticisms. Firstly, disabled 
people, while being permanent. members of a specific society, are not able to 
contribute reciprocally to the cooperative venture of a. society on an equal foot­
ing. Secondly, foreigners who might be in social relationships with citizens of 
a country do not actually partake fully in the cooperative venture of a society. 
Thus, basing justice on a condition of reciprocity might lead to ethically unap­
pealing results with regard to people \Vith disabilities and to foreigners. In both 
cases there is a risk that., due to the reciprocity condition, people with disabilities 
or foreigners will be ascribed a status inferior to other members of society. In his 
article, Lister provides a reading of the rer:iprocity condition whir:h is meant to 
solve this difficulty. Lister proposes that. t.he reciprocity condition should be seen 
a.':i comprising two aspects since, on the one hand, it. restricts conditions under 
\Vhich duties of justice apply while, on the other hand, it includes a. duty to es­
tablish institutions ensuring relationships of mutual recognition as equals. Such 
institutions should, according to List.er, lead to a fair distribution of cooperative 
benefits on egalitarian grounds. 
Although I agree \Vith Lister's interpretation of Ra.wls's reciprocity condition 
concerning duties of justice, this comment will question Lister's latter claim 
that a duty to establish relationships of mutual recognition as equals necessarily 
entails a duty to establish institutions ensuring an egalitarian distribution of 
cooperative benefits (2.). This has serious consequences \Vit.h regard to Lister's 
solution concerning the problem of global justice and the duties we might have to 
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foreigners. As my argument will suggest, which substantial distributional scheme 
is appropriate to ensure relationships of mutual recognition as equals depends 
strongly on t.he specific context. (3.). Consequently, the same applies to the 
distributive claims of people \Vith disabilities. In addition, as I will show in the 
last step of my argument, arguing on egalitarian grounds for the distributional 
claims of mentally or psychologically disabled people contradicts our intuitions 
about justice in this context (4.). 
2. Two Levels of Cooperative Benefits 
Contractarian accounts of justice are committed to t.he idea of justice as mutual 
advantage. This commitment grounds daims of justice in the idea of reciprocity. 
In A Thmry of Justice, Rawls claimed that justice applies only in circumstances 
'vhcrc people arc roughly equal in ability (1999, 109-12). Concerning the com­
mitment to reciprocity, this means that only those who arc roughly equal in 
their ability to contribute to t.he cooperative venture of a society are entitled to 
claims of justice as equals. However, this seems to confiict with Ra.wls's Kan­
tian commitment to an equal standing of all individuals; disabled people are 
excluded from the scope of justice because they cannot reciprocally contribute 
a.'i equals. In consequence, their standing r:annot be that of equals, but only 
of inferiors relative to those able to contribute on roughly equal grounds. In 
addition, regarding questions of global justice, foreigners involved \:Vith citizens 
of a society are not entitled to claims of justice as equals because they are not 
cooperating members of a society in the full sense. In consequence, there is a 
risk that the standards of justice applied to foreigners do not ensure their equal 
standing either. Therefore, 1\ussbaurn (2006, 119) seems right. to observe that 
"It I he structural feature of rough equality and the goal of mutual advantage I· . .  I 
shape the account of \vho is initially included and \vhat each party is trying to 
get out of cooperating". 
In order to address these issues, Lister puts forward t\vo arguments. First, he 
claims that the reciprocity condition cannot by itself be the basis for justifying 
specific distributional claims. Instead, a baseline must be presupposed which 
serves as a standard by which to measure \vhat counts as an entitlement to a. fair 
share of r:ooperative benefits. \Vithout such a standard, the recipror:it.y condition 
is arbitrary with regard to what benefits someone is entitled to if she or he enters 
a cooperative venture and contributes on an equal footing to its benefits. Thus, 
the reciprocity condition could also apply to claims about egalitarian justice &'i 
to claims about initial acquisition in a state of nature. \Vhilc egalitarians claim 
that reciprocal contribution to cooperative benefits presupposes a standard of 
equal distribution, libertarians daim that the standard of reciprocal contribution 
lies in compliance with rules of just acquisition. Consequently, \vhat counts &'i 
reciprocally contributing to the cooperative venture of a society depends on what 
theory of justice is presupposed and not on the reciprocity condition itself. 
Second, Lister suggests that, instead of constituting a foundation for distri­
butional claims, the reciprocity condition must be understood as a restriction 
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on the conditions under \Vhich duties of justice apply. Such duties demand that 
individuals should cornply with just institutions and in so doing uphold justice 
itself. This indudes t\vo r:onditions for duties of justice to hold: on the one 
hand, institutions must exist and be just, on the other hand, it must be rea­
sonable for individuals to expect that others gaining from such institutions do 
their part as \Vell (TI.awls 1999, 99). Consequently, Lister claims that duties of 
justir:e only apply when there is a cooperative involvement among individuals 
ensuring reciprocal compliance \Vith just institutions. Should neither such coop­
erative involvement nor any just institutions to regulate the cooperative venture 
exist, then duties of justice do not apply. \Vhen at least cooperative involvement 
exists, these duties boil down to a duty to "further just arrangements not yet 
established [ ... )" (Rawls 1999, 99). This is a duty to establish appropriate insti­
tutions. In this sense, the reciprocity condition is only a condition of restriction 
and does not positively contribute to the defence of any distributional scheme. 
However, Lister's conclusion is unconvincing for those who believe that duties 
of justice do not only arise when social institutions exist but that the duties 
of justice are unmnditional. According to Lister, though, not all duties are 
unconditional, because in the case of some duties it matters whether others can 
be expected to comply. Some duties \vould be over-demanding if our compliance 
\vere not restricted by others playing their part. Hence, such duties must only be 
fulfilled if all contribute. If, for example, building a drain depends on all affected 
land mvners shouldering their share of the burden, then the duty on each to 
contribute to the project should be conditional on others fulfilling their respective 
duties as \vell. Otherwise, no-one is under any duty to do their share, because 
the drain can only be realized by all r:ontributing and because, in the absence 
of everyone's compliance, time could be used for more promising projects. It 
would simply be irrational to commit oneself to such cooperation (Hampton 
1987, 261 2) . 
Following Lister, the same applies to duties of justice. Hmvever, the goal 
of their realization is not causally linked to r:ontributors doing their part but 
constitutive of the duty itself. Lister daims that a constitutive element of duties 
of justice is to establish relationships of mutual recognition as equals. This goal 
needs reciprocal compliance by others, because relationships of mutual recogni­
tion as equals can only be established if all those involved show equal respect. 
Otherwise, such a duty would be over-demanding. It \VOuld have to be followed 
at the risk of being dominated by others, since respect and recognition would 
only be given one-sidedly. As such one-sidedness allows for no mutuality of 
recognition on equal footing, the overall goal of such duty cannot be reached. 
From this argument, Lister derives the further daim, that distributional sr:hemes 
must start from a standard of equality. Otherwise mutual recognition as equals 
is not possible. 
However, as plausible as this last step of the argument might look like for 
distributional egalitarians, it proceeds too quickly. It is not at all necessary to 
presuppose initial equality with respect to distribution in order to ensure mutual 
recognition as equals. There is a categorical difference between claiming that 
certain duties depend on the mutuality of recognition for each other as equals and 
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substantial claims about distribution (I\1iller 1999, 231-2). I\1utual recognition 
as equals is a matter of status equality, which is a widely accepted social ideal 
in the context of justice and, at lea ..c;t in \vestern societies today, very difficult, 
if not impossible, to put into question (Gosepath 2002; Kymlicka 2002, 3 5). In 
contrast, the ans,ver to the question of \vhat kind of substantial distributional 
scheme is appropriate for realizing such mutual recognition as equals is pretty 
unclear and, as Lister (in my vie\v correctly) mentions, depends on what theory 
of justice is presupposed. 
Hence, accepting, the fundamental difference between establishment of rela­
tionships of mutual recognition as equals and an appropriate scheme of distri­
bution shows that Lister's argument does not solve the problem of what sub­
stantial distributional scheme should accompany the reciprocity condition he 
arg,ues for. This difference shows that cooperative involvement leads to bene­
fits on two different levels. Compliance with duties of justice in a cooperative 
venture establishes relationships of mutual recognition as equals, \vhich requires 
that institutions secure such a state of affairs. This is a first and fundamen­
tal benefit of such cooperation. Only on a second level, however, might such 
cooperation lead to just distributions defended on eg,alitarian grounds. Thus, 
if there is a difference between establishing relationships of mutual recognition 
as equals and adequate distributional schemes for its realization, then further 
argument is needed to explain why just distribution must start from a standard 
of distributional equality. Lister does not provide any such argument. In the 
next t\vo paragraphs I want to illustrate, \vhy this is especially problematic in 
his two contexts of application, global justice and people with disabilities. 
3. Mutual Recognition as Equals on a Global Level 
An appealing result of Lister's reading of the reciprocity condition is his claim 
that we have a duty to establish just institutions as soon as there is relevant in­
teraction among individuals and no sur:h institutional arrangements exist. In the 
context of global justice this leads to a. duty to establish institutions regulating 
relationships under condition that reasonable assurance of reciprocity is given. 
This appears very sensible, since more comprehensive accounts of duties of global 
justir:e are often ar:cused of being over-demanding (see, for example Gosepath 
2007, 229-30). If such duties only persist under the condition of relevant inter­
action, and if they merely prescribe the establishment of just institutions, then 
these duties are much less demanding. In other words, these duties demand po­
litical action to help establish such institutions but do not claim for self-sacrifice 
with regard to the needs of those abroad. However, the question of the exact 
nature of these institutions remains unclear, because Lister is vague about what 
constitutes reasonable assurance of reciprocity. 
Lister argues that for reciprocity to occur it is enough that sufficient causal 
contact exists among individuals. In our global \vorld this could mean not only 
economic involvement but also the influence through tourism or reciprocal re­
spect of private property. Therefore, the possible contexts in which duties of 
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justice may arise arc very broad; too broad, in my view, to argue that a duty to 
establish relationships of mutual recognition as equals is necessarily linked with 
substantial distributional claims along the lines of egalitarian distributional jus­
tice. This becomes especially dear in the contexts of economics or of severe 
poverty in a country 'vith tourism. In both of these contexts, the nature of the 
appropriate institutions to be established is different and in my vicv,· highlights 
the far:t that different distributional schemes might be relevant leading to just 
institutions with respective nature. 
Lister uses the example of international trade relationships to explore the 
benefit of his reading of the reciprocity condition. A duty to establish insti­
tutions ensuring mutual rer:ognition and respect arises if relevant causal inter­
action exists, such as cooperation among market actors. Hmvever, cooperative 
ventures in international trade arise in an international free market system. In 
such a system, supply and demand regulate prices of products and goods. Ac­
tors in these markets negotiate within this framework for appropriate prices for 
their products and r:ontributions to cooperative ventures. Thus, in a free mar­
ket system distributions in cooperation are just if they are negotiated on fair 
grounds. Consequently, institutions to regulate free market systems only con­
stitute background conditions under 'vhich such negotiations take place but do 
not prescribe any specific substantial scheme of fair distribution. The reason for 
this is that further regulation 'vith regard to distribution would question, and 
possibly undermine, the function of free market systems in allocating and dis­
tributing prices for products and contributions to cooperative ventures through 
its ovm processes, a function which Rmvls (1999, 242) ascribes to them. 
This last point is important for determining actually what duties of justice 
demand if we follow Lister's reading of the recipror:ity condition. The institutions 
in question should regulate negotiations so as to exclude exploitation and secure 
fair negotiating conditions for fixing shares proportional to market prices and 
contribution to cooperative ventures. In so doing, they ensure mutual respect 
and recognition as equals among trading partners. In addition, such institutions 
should enforce r:ompliance with rules of fair negotiation. This allows for reason­
able assurance of reciprocity concerning complim1ee with these rules. However, 
accepting a free market system as the framc,York for international trade does 
not, according to what we have said thus far, prescribe any substantial schemes 
of (egalitarian) distribution. But this is exactly 'vhat List er believes sterns from 
his reading of the reciprocity condition. 
If this were indeed the upshot of Lister's reading of the reciprocity condition, 
then the v.rholc economic system would have to be changed, maybe in the direc­
tion of a socialist market regime. However, according to Rawls, in the context 
of economics this goes way beyond the sr:ope of a theory of justice. He believes 
that there is no general answer to what economic system is appropriate for ful­
filling the requirements of justice. The answer to this question "I· . .  I depends 
in large part upon the traditions, institutions, and social forces of each country, 
and itR partir:ular historical r:ircurnstances" (Rawls 1999, 242). In the context of 
international trade, it depends on these social and historical matters on a global 
level. 
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Lister of course could try to counter this argument for context sensitivity; he 
could argue that. a theory of justir:e advances dairns about ideal and not non­
ideal theory, \vhich has t.o respect norms existing under non-ideal r:ircumstances. 
If that were the case, however, his theory would forfeit its applicability because 
it could only be defended together with a totally different understanding of hmv 
free market systems should work. Therefore, to retain the applicability of his 
theory Lister ha.s to accept. that in t.he r:ontext of international trade it. is in­
appropriate to prescribe a. specific substantial distributional scheme stemming 
from the duty to establish relationships of mutual recognition a.'i equals. Hence, 
accepting Lister's reading of the reciprocity condition does not allmv us to de­
cide whir:h substantial distribution of cooperative benefits is just. with regard t.o 
international trade. 
The same applies in the context of severe poverty. If \Ve assume that suf­
ficient causal contact exists among the severely poor inhabitants of a country 
and the tourists visiting this country, this interaction \Vill trigger, as a matter of 
justir:e, the duty to establish institutions ensuring mutual recognition as equals 
among t.he poor locals and the tourists. Although in this r:ase there might be no 
straightforward question about the fair sharing of cooperative benefits, the ex­
istence of such sufficient causal contact seems, following Lister's understanding 
of the reciprocity condition, to suggest that the poor locals would be entitled to 
claims of justir:e anyway. 
Therefore, the poor locals should, for instance, be provided \Vith goods suffi­
cient to live a human life in dignity. Certainly, such a distributional claim could 
be defended on egalitarian grounds but it would also be possible to defend it (and 
in my view it. should be defended) on the basis of a non-relational (and in this 
sense non-egalitarian) standard of need. Institutions are necessary, from both 
perspectives, to provide resources and to distribute them adequately. Hence, al­
though both viev.rs would accept that a just distribution of goods is necessary to 
ensure mutual recognition as equals among poor locals and tourists, it remains 
unclear what substantial distributional scheme is appropriate t.o realize this goal. 
Thus, this argument shows again that. establishing relationships of mutual 
recognition as equals is a cooperative benefit which is not necessarily linked 
\vith any specific substantial distributional scheme, a cooperative benefit located 
on a different level of cooperation. \Vhich substantial distributional scheme 
is appropriate t.o establish such relationships is highly context sensitive and 
depends on the theory of justice presupposed. Hence, this applies, too, to the 
nature of the institutions to be established to fulfil duties of justice. 
4. Mutual Recognition as Equals for Non-Contributors 
Recently, Stark has argued that Rawls's theory of justice is incomplete \Vith re­
gard to people with disabilities. Rawls's presumption of rough equality in ability 
is neither needed for, nor does it fit coherently into, his theory of _justice. In the 
original position, parties don't know anything about their natural talents. lly 
denying such awareness Rawls wants to ensure that principles are chosen which 
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guarantee everyone an equal status, because such uncertainty makes it impossi­
ble to argue from strategic reasons r:oncerning one's talents. If one ar:cepts that 
disability is a lack of natural talent., then Rawls does not. need to and r:annot 
defend his background conditions of justice, \Vhich claim among other things 
that all individuals arc roughly equal \vith regard to ability (Stark 2009, 79-
80). Hence, disabled people must also be included in the group in the original 
position arguing for the principles of justice. The resulting principles of justice 
vwuld then also legitimate claims of justice for disabled people. These, however, 
would have to exclude the condition of reciprocal contribution as that would 
undermine disabled people's own claims (84).1 
However, Rawls's statement. in Politiml Libemli8rn that a necessary human 
condition to have legitimate claims of justice are normal abilities to cooperate, 
conflicts with his Kantian aim to guarantee equal moral standing for all. This 
is \vhy Stark argues that, although natural talents as well as disability should 
be irrelevant with regard to legitimate claims of justice, one specific ability, the 
ability to engage in sor:ial cooperation, is not morally irrelevant.. In consequence, 
Rawls's theory does not apply to those who are not able to r:ooperate. This leads 
Stark to the conclusion that Rm:vls only provides a. theory of justice for those able 
to cooperate and not for the rest. Thus, Rmvls's theory of justice is incomplete 
(Stark 2009, 89-91; cf. 1\ussbaum 2006, 108f.). 
List.er does not go as far as Stark in his paper. He agrees with her with regard 
to the incompleteness of Rawls's theory, because he accepts that beings (animals 
and plants as well as perhaps some severely disabled people or psychopaths), not 
able to enter relationships of mutual recognition as equals arc not owed justice. 
In contrast to Stark, Lister argues that his reading of the rer:iprocity condition 
allows the integration of disabled people's distributional claims in a Rawlsian 
theory of justice. Following his reading of the reciprocity condition, Rawls does 
not claim that demands of justice only apply to those able to contribute to 
the cooperative benefits of a society on roughly equal footing. Rather, because 
Rawls presupposes that the standard to mea,sure contribution on the basis of 
reciprocity must. start from a standard of equality, all those unable but willing 
to contribute to the cooperative benefit on an equal footing are entitled to an 
equal share, too. 
In terms of egalitarian principles of justice, this means that an unequal contri­
bution legitimates an unequal share of distributive benefits under the condition 
that it can be justified with regard to the choices and faults of those contributing 
(Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989). If such unequal contribution depends on circum-
1 \Vit.h regard to his description of the parties in the original position Rawls (1999, llR 9) 
could counter Lhis argumenL: "His assumed [ . .. J t,hat, t,he parties do not know ccrLain kinds or 
particular facts. r .. . .\]o one knows [ ... ] his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and 
abilities. [ ... T)he only part.icnlar facts which the parties knmv is that their society is subject 
Lo the ci rcumsta.nces or jusLice [ . . . J." As ci rcumsta.nces or jusLice presuppose rough equa.liLy 
in ability to contribute and parties in the original position only have knowledge about these 
circumstances , they would have to assume that "individuals are roughly similar in physical and 
mental powers" (R.awls 1971, 125f.), which excludes people with disabilities. Although in a 
longer discussion or Rawls's Lheory t,his possible count,er arg-ument would have Lobe considered, 
1 will ignore it in the follo;ving. 
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stances 'vhich do not lie in an individual's scope to take responsibility for its 
decisions, however, then unequal distribution of cooperative benefits r:annot be 
justified. Hence, with regard t.o people with disabilities it is relevant to distin­
guish betv.reen those unable and those unwilling to contribute to the cooperative 
benefits of a society on an equal footing. Those v.rilling but unable to contribute 
arc entitled to an equal share of the cooperative benefits of society, even though 
they do not. contribute as equals. According to Lister, this allows t.o argue for a 
claim of disabled people to be provided \Vith adequate resources so as not to be 
dominated by those able to contribute as equals. Hence, disabled people are, a.'i 
a matter of justice, entitled to assistance to preclude such domination. 
In my view, this argument is problematic for two reasons, firstly, it. is plausible 
to distinguish between those who want but cannot r:ont.ribut.e t.o the cooperative 
venture of a. society if bodily handicaps a.re at issue. Such impairment does not 
entail any inability to state one's \Villingness to contribute and take responsibil­
ity for such a decision. Disabled people who have no mental or psychological 
impairments r:an express and reflect their willingness to contribute but. are, due 
to their handicap, not. able to do so on an equal footing. However, when it. comes 
to people with mental or psychological impairments, such a distinction becomes 
more difficult, if not impossible. Someone with schizophrenic disorder cannot in 
full responsibility decide about his willingness to contribute to the cooperative 
venture of a society. A psychopath might intentionally object. to such convention. 
Therefore, in the first case there is a. risk that people with mental impairment are 
deprived of their legitimate claims to justice. In the second case a. psychopath 
might be excluded from the scope of justice because he is misjudged as unwilling 
to contribute. However, in both cases, and in all other cases in which someone 
shows unwillingness to cooperate, in rny view intuition tells us there is a legit­
imate entitlement to assistance as a claim of distributional justice, irrespective 
of any \villingness or unwillingness to cooperate (cf. Kussba.um 2006, 129 30). 
This leads to a second, much deeper, problem. In order to prevent the domi­
nation of non-contributors, a level of abilities must. be reached sufficient. to allow 
individuals t.o participate as equals in society. This is a claim Lister adopts from 
Anderson. In my vie\v within a. liberal framework such a level of sufficiency not 
only includes the resources necessary for participation but also the achievement 
of appropriate qualifications and abilities. Ivlost important among these is an 
ability to make responsible decisions regarding one's own life and behaviour. 
Hmvever, with regard to mentally disabled or psychologically impaired people 
a.'i well as children, lots of assistance is necessary to achieve such abilities, even 
if only to a minimal level. Admittedly, defending such an entitlement for as­
sistance on egalitarian grounds is unfeasible. Egalitarian principles presuppose 
that individuals are able to take responsibility for their decisions because respon­
sible choice is the only legitimate criterion to justify unequal distribution. As at 
least some people with mental or psychological impairments as well as children 
do not possess these abilities in the full sense such individuals' entitlement to 
a fair share of the cooperative benefits of a society cannot. be judged by their 
willingness to contribute. Hence, an egalitarian theory of justice is inr:omplete 
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'vhen it comes to questions about legitimate claims of justice 'vith regard to such 
individuals. 2 
In consequence, Lister's reading of the reciprocity condition must either make 
a different distinction between disabled people and normal contributors, which 
allows us to decide v.rho is entitled to assistance as legitimate claim of distribu­
tional justice even v,rhen he does not contribute to the cooperative venture of a 
society on an equal footing, or he must accept that R.awls's theory is incomplete. 
In the first case, it would be possible to argue on non-egalitarian grounds for 
an entitlement for all respected a.<; equals to obtain the abilities necessary to re­
sponsibly decide whether they want to contribute to the cooperative venture of a 
society or not. 3 In the ser:ond ca.se, following Stark, one v,·ould have to argue for 
a theory of justice appropriate for mentally and psychologically disabled people, 
\Vhich cannot be understood a.<; an extension of the theory R.awls provides. In my 
view, such a theory would have to be grounded on beliefs about justice which 
arc not dependent on egalitarian principles. Therefore, this discussion shmvs 
again that it is, at the very least, unclear that a duty of justice to establish 
relationships of mutual recognition as equals must necessarily be combined with 
egalitarian principles of justice as the basis for its institutions. 
5 .  Conclusion 
The aim of this comment has not been to show that Lister's reading of the reci­
procity condition is implausible. Rather, this reading is an appealing starting 
point of an interrogation of what reciprocity could mean in contractarian the­
ories of justice, because it shows how the harshness of this condition could be 
overcome without dmvnplaying its role. This conunent has challenged Lister's 
view that his reading of the reciprocity condition is necessarily linked \Vith egal­
itarian principles of justice. It has argued for three points. First, it is not at all 
clear that a duty to establish institutions guaranteeing relationships of mutual 
recognition as equals must necessarily be accompanied by substantial distribu­
tional schemes egalitarian in character. Second, with regard to global justice, 
what kind of distributional scheme is appropriate for realizing relationships of 
mutual respect as equals is highly dependent on context. Third, concerning peo­
ple with mental or psychological impairments, Lister's reading of the rer:iprocity 
condition seems to advance criteria which cannot be appropriately linked with 
egalitarian principles for just distribution. 
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